obligations to protect human rights. When the 'quasi sovereign' character of camp administration is considered in light of the particular vulnerability of refugees, it is clear that the protection of their human rights cannot be separated from camp administration or the camp administrator, which is often UNHCR. Further, there is an obligation for all parties who undertake RSD, including UNHCR, to respect non-refoulement, which is the obligation to not expel or return a person to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened by persecution or torture and is considered the 'cornerstone' of international protection. As a consequence, a concurrent obligation is created to ensure that RSD procedures are fair, efficient and effective.
Finally, in the Conclusion the lack of remedies for human rights violations is considered and potential ways forward suggested.
I. DOES UNHCR HAVE THE CAPACITY TO HOLD HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS?
Sometimes the constitutions of International Organizations (IOs) or their subsidiary bodies expressly place a non-State actor within the framework of human rights. For example, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that established the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) declares that the High Commissioner shall:
Function within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal rights and to whom are they due?
Source of UNHCR's Human Rights Obligations I: Position as a Subsidiary Organ of the UN
UNHCR's position as a UN subsidiary organ, which is confirmed by article 1 of its Statute, 5 means that whilst UNHCR acts in a manner that can be described as somewhat independent, it cannot be separated from the UN as an organization. In particular, UNHCR facilitates the functions of the UNGA by adopting and carrying out its decisions. Further, UNHCR's tasks and functions are dependent on the scope of UNGA's powers, 6 meaning that it cannot be delegated more powers than UNGA possesses. 7 As a consequence, UNHCR's acts are not only attributable to the UN; it derives its international legal personality from it. Both attribution and international legal personality create obligations for UNHCR to protect the human rights of refugees in certain circumstances. (v) . UNHCR assumes the function of international protection 'under the auspices of the United Nations' and that it acts 'under the authority of the General Assembly'. Accordingly, UNHCR is a subsidiary organ of the UN because it functions under its 'auspices' and acts under the authority of the UNGA, which itself is an organ of the UN. 6 
The Human Rights Obligations of the UN
If UNHCR's capacity to hold human rights obligations stem from its position as a UN subsidiary organ, then it follows that the UN must also have the capacity to hold human rights obligations. This proposition rests on four foundations. First, the UN is a subject of international law because it has international legal personality 8 that is dependent upon its 'purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.' 9 In the WHO Case the ICJ stated that 'international organizations are subjects of international law, and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties'. 10 Article 38 of the ICJ Statute does not define what comprises 'general rules of international law' and whilst its human rights component continues to attract debate, 11 it is largely accepted that it incorporates both jus cogens, which are peremptory norms from which no derogation is permitted, 12 and laws that derive from custom. 13 Accordingly, the UN will be bound by human rights obligations that are either customary international law or jus cogens.
This argument encounters difficulty from the fact that the State is a fundamental component of customary international law, which makes any assertion that obligations are 'incumbent' upon the UN problematic. However, two factors point to an obligation for the UN to respect customary international law. First, the UN, as an organization, is considered a subject of international law whose 'duties depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice'. 14 Logically there is no impediment to the extension of its rights 8 from the UN. 46 Although the ICJ was referring to the UN when it declared that 'the rights and duties of … the Organization must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice', 47 the court established that non-State actors may possess some international legal personality but only to the extent of the 'function they are to fulfil in that legal order', 48 or to the extent that States as the subjects of international law confer on them. The purpose and functions that can be implied from constituent documents and subsequent practice will depend on the particular organization, but they must be conferred by reasonable implication 'as capacities required to enable the organizationss to discharge their functions effectively.' 49 The ICJ has confirmed this approach in subsequent cases.
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Although it has been argued that UNHCR has international legal personality simply by virtue of being an IO, 51 even a more narrow approach (i.e. that UNHCR has only that degree of international legal personality that is conferred on it by the UN 52 )
establishes its capacity to hold human rights obligations. As human rights obligations are a component of the UN's international legal personality, those obligations will flow from the UN to UNHCR, albeit in a way that is dictated by the objectives and functions of UNHCR, which, as discussed in Part II, relate to the protection of refugees. 60 According to Klabbers, the identification of an IO by reference to traditional formal criteria is unhelpful because law is largely unable to make such distinctions. Klabbers (n 50) 152.
Source of UNHCR's Human Rights Obligations II: General Rules of International Law

II UNHCR'S IMPLIED POWERS AS A SOURCE OF ITS HUAMN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
As an IO understood in the broad sense outlined above, UNHCR has the capacity for implied powers. 61 As an organization with the capacity for human rights obligations, it is argued that two of these powers, the administration of refugee camps and RSD, carry obligations to adhere to certain human rights standards.
The Administration of Refugee Camps and RSD as Implied Powers of UNHCR
Implied powers of an institution are additional (but not 'new' 62 ) powers to those that are expressed in a body's constituent instrument. In Reparations, the ICJ defined implied powers in the following way:
Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.
63
Keeping to one side controversies around the breadth of this definition and whether it should be confined to those powers that are necessarily implied by the powers expressly granted in an IO's constitution, 64 if UNHCR has powers that are necessarily implied as being essential to the performance of its duties, then it is essential that it have the ability to define and adopt measures to 'achieve the object and purpose of supervising the international framework governing refugee protection'. power to undertake these activities, it may not be able to do so if it has not been issued an invitation to operate within the State's territory. Second, an implied power to undertake protection activities is a power and not an obligation. Whilst Verdirame argues that obligations can equally be implied into a constituent instrument (advocating for the alternative 'implied terms') 76 it is important that UNHCR's ability to undertake protection activities is perceived as a power to ensure that it is not burdened with new protection obligations that it was never intended to have. This, however, does not mean that UNHCR's implied powers cannot contain obligations to exercise the power in accordance with broadly-accepted aspirations, such as human rights protection. Once UNHCR has committed to undertaking these activities, they become part of its relationship with refugees and are the catalyst for the identification of its human rights obligations.
Protecting Human Rights in Refugee Camps
An obligation for UNHCR to adhere to human rights standards is inherent to its administration of refugee camps. It is argued that as an organization with direct engagement with individuals and groups who are protected by human rights, 120 UNHCR must respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of the inhabitants of the camps it administers. 121 UNHCR identifies the importance of a 'rights based approach' in operational camps and settlements 122 and acknowledges that it 'has a global mandate to ensure that the human rights of its beneficiaries are upheld in accordance with the international obligations of States hosting them.' 123 Although an IO's obligations to 'protect and fulfil' human rights may be contested, 124 it is argued that the particular vulnerability of refugees in camps, the role of UNHCR in the provision of fundamental goods, services and overall governance, and the diminished role of host States, means that UNHCR has a duty to protect and fulfil the human rights of refugees within the camps that it administers to the 'extent that their functions allow them to fulfil such a duty'. 125 This duty arises from its own human rights obligations and not those of States. UNHCR's role in overseeing the provision of humanitarian aid and taking on the responsibility of 'care
and maintenance' in lieu of the host State means it is not only accountable for the respect and protection of human rights, it must fulfil them by providing services and developing strategies to build capacities that ensure their human rights are met.
126
UNHCR's implied power to administer refugee camps cannot be separated from an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of the individuals and groups residing within refugee camps. Whilst this obligation may not rely upon binding international instrumentality, it forms part of UNHCR's wider role of international protection.
Non-refoulement, RSD and Procedural Standards
Responsibility for RSD lies with States. 127 However, where States abdicate their protection duties, which primarily occurs when a State lacks the resources and capacity to carry out RSD, or where a host State is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention but hosts a large number of refugees, UNHCR has little choice but to conduct RSD itself. The fact that UNHCR is a substitute decision maker with significant resource and capacity restraints 128 does not justify a weaker application of procedural standards by UNHCR. The need to respect the human rights principle of non-refoulement creates an obligation for UNHCR to meet the same procedural standards in RSD as States. It is argued that these standards are, at a minimum, that RSD be fair, efficient and effective. argues that when the rule of non-refoulement is combined with the 'guarantee of effective legal protection -a general principle of law-the RSD obligation is created: an obligation to conduct refugee status determination in a manner which provides effective legal protection against the possibility of refoulement or denial of rights due under the refugee convention.' 144 In view of the nature of the risks involved and the grave consequences of an erroneous determination, it is essential that asylum-seekers be afforded full procedural safeguards and guarantees at all stages of the procedure. UNHCR, 'Fair and efficient asylum procedures: a non-exhaustive overview of applicable international standards' 2 September 2005, 1.
RSD procedures are 'fair and efficient or expeditious' 145 or 'fair and effective'. 146 In a report on fair and efficient asylum processes, UNHCR stated that:
Fair and efficient procedures are an essential element in the full and inclusive application of the Convention. They enable a State to identify those who should benefit from international protection under the Convention, and those who should not. 147 The ExCom has also acknowledged the link between international protection and the need for 'fair and efficient' procedures by emphasising:
[T]he importance of establishing and ensuring access … to fair and efficient procedures for the determination of refugee status in order to ensure that refugees and other persons eligible for protection under international or national law are identified and granted protection. 148 The ExCom has also recognised a link between non-refoulement and 'fair and effective' procedures. The ExCom:
Strongly deplores the continuing incidence and often tragic humanitarian consequences of refoulement in all its forms, including through summary removals, occasionally en masse, and reiterates in this regard the need to admit refugees to the territory of States, which includes no rejection at frontiers without access to fair and effective procedures for determining their status and protection needs. 149 It is argued that by virtue of relevant instruments, case law, UNGA resolutions and UNHCR/ExCom policy, there is a minimum requirement for RSD to be fair, efficient and effective, which is linked to non-refoulement in such a way as to be inextricable from it. 150 Each of these elements will be considered in turn. (ii) adequate resources to ensure efficiency, to identify those in need of protection quickly and to curb abuse;
(iii) an appeal to an authority different from and independent of that making the initial decision; and (iv) a single process to deal with both refugee status and complementary forms of protection.
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What 'effective' means in the context of refugee-related decisions has been considered by the ECtHR in regards to the requirements for an 'effective remedy', as stipulated by article 13 of the ECHR. 153 In Chahal v United Kingdom, a case where the applicant, who was a Sikh, was facing deportation from the UK to India for national security reasons, the ECtHR found that an effective remedy requires 'independent scrutiny of the claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3…' 154 UNHCR has also stated that an effective remedy is a 'second instance' appeal where law and fact are considered (i.e. judicial review). 155 Considering UNHCR and judicial opinion together, effectiveness in RSD can be perceived as the resources, expertise and availability of first instance decision making and independent review to ensure legally correct determinations.
The term efficiency is not given a general meaning in UNHCR or ExCom documentation, but is often used interchangeably or in conjunction with the need for expeditious decision making. 156 Expeditious decision making, or the right to RSD 'without unreasonable delay' has been argued to be an element of due process that is sourced from articles 6-11 of the UDHR and articles 13-14 of the ICCPR.
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Considering Erika Feller has stated that 'adequate resources to ensure efficiency' is part of an effective RSD system, 158 efficiency within the RSD context can be taken to mean the efficient allocation and use of resources, as well as the expectation that RSD procedures are performed expeditiously.
Fairness is an elusive concept because it is both contextual and multi-faceted. Rather than being understood as encompassing ideals of democracy or good governance, fairness within the context of administrative decision making takes on a narrower 'procedural-type' meaning to stand for concepts of procedural fairness, natural justice or due process. 159 The most fundamental element of fairness is an impartial and independent hearing, which is required by article 14(1) of the ICCPR. In A v Australia, the Australian government challenged an argument that RSD could be subject to article 14(1) by arguing that proceedings relating to refugee status do not deal with civil rights or obligations and that the decision to allow entry into its territory is a matter for the State concerned. Whilst not making a finding that RSD is always subject to the procedural standards set out in article 14(1), the HRC left the matter open by finding that:
The issue whether the proceedings … fall within the scope of article 14, paragraph 1, is a question which should be considered on its merits.
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UNHCR and ExCom have also identified 161 an impartial or independent review as being integral to a fair RSD system. 162 Other elements of procedurally fair RSD that they identified are access to information, 163 access to an interpreter, 164 an opportunity to adequately present a case 165 
IV CONCLUSION
States have both the ultimate responsibility for international protection and the ability to prevent UNHCR from achieving its own mandate by refusing access to refugees in its territory. Ideally, UNHCR's role in camp administration and RSD would be decreased through greater State responsibility and burden sharing via increased funding and raised quotas for refugee intake. A State-backed and funded mechanism for review of UNHCR RSD is urgently needed. An independent and impartial review mechanism, whatever its form, will provide asylum seekers with an effective remedy that will enable an independent arbiter to decide whether the procedural standards of 'fairness, efficiency and effectiveness' are being met, and fundamentally, guard against non-refoulement.
However, as long as UNHCR engages in camp administration and RSD, it is imperative that it retains limited human rights obligations that exist alongside of, and not in substitution for, those of States. The difficulty with this proposition, however, is the lack of remedies available for individuals who seek to hold IO's, including immunities. 173 The difficulty of seeking redress for human rights abuse does not, however, remove the capacity to hold human rights obligations in the first place.
Although UNHCR's primary role remains international protection facilitated through
State collaboration, its direct interaction with vulnerable individuals renders any suggestion that UNHCR has no obligation to protect their human rights as untenable.
When UNHCR's implied powers are considered with its capacity to hold human rights obligations, which comes from its position as a subsidiary organ of the UN and from general principles of international law, accountability is created for UNHCR to protect the human rights of refugees in certain circumstances. In particular, UNHCR's implied powers of administering refugee camps creates an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of refugees who reside within those camps. Finally, UNHCR's implied power to conduct RSD creates an obligation for it to ensure that its RSD procedures are fair, efficient and effective as a means of acting as a bulwark against non-refoulement. 173 In the recent case of Georges et al v United Nations, heard in the New York District Court, a group of Haitian residents lodged a class action against the UN for liability for the 2010 cholera outbreak that killed thousands and injured many more. Although the UN denied culpability for the outbreak, it is commonly accepted that the cause was inadequate sanitation in a camp used by Nepalese peacekeepers. The court found that as UN refused to expressly waive its immunity, it was immune from suit. Any alleged inadequacy of the UN's failure to offer an alternative mode of settlement, such as settling the private law claim or establishing a Standing Claims Commission, did not undermine the requirement for express waiver.
Georges et al suggests a shy potential for a reinterpretation of section 29(a) of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations ('Convention on Immunities') (1 UNTS 15. Applies to UNHCR as a subsidiary organ), which states that '[t]he United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of … disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law character to which the United Nations is a party.' The court acknowledged that the word shall 'is more than merely aspirational' and that 'it is obligatory and perhaps enforceable.' Although the court found that section 29 could not override the clear and specific grant of immunity in section 2, it may be that a court willing to take a more teleological approach would render an interpretation of section 29 a necessary precondition to the grant of immunity, in accordance with the object and purpose (Vienna Convention (n 10) art 31(1)) of the Convention on Immunities, which was, after all, to ensure independence of the UN from its members (D Sarooshi, 'The Powers of the United Nations Criminal Tribunals' in J. A. Frowein and R Wolfru (eds) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 2 (Kluwer Law International 1998) 141, 191) and not immunity from the suit of individuals.
